International Journal of Biomedical Engineering and Clinical Science
Volume 4, Issue 2, June 2018, Pages: 36-47
Received: Mar. 7, 2018;
Accepted: Mar. 27, 2018;
Published: Apr. 18, 2018
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Min Zhou, School of Business Administration, Hunan University of Commerce, Changsha, China; School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
Lindu Zhao, School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
Shujuan Qu, The Third Xiangya Hospital of Central South University, Changsha, China
Kathryn Sarah Campy, Center for Public Health Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
In China, 10% of medical resource are general hospital which treat 86% patients. This will lead the health resources in these hospitals become insufficient and exhaust, even if the resources in other hospitals idle. Previous studies have indicated that the scattering resource systems will result in significant imbalances if it lacks stable and effective match. To deal with Two-Sided Matching (TSM) problem in hierarchical medical system, a matching decision-making approach based on multiple scenarios was proposed. The algorithm was designed to adapt four kinds of scenarios, it analyzed multi-context matching satisfaction degree of these cooperation situations in different forms of environment respectively and specifically．By comparing the examples, the multi - scenario dynamic matching method is superior to the random matching algorithm and the “F-Y” algorithm (improved G - S algorithm), and it is effective to obtain the stable and feasible solution. This paper showed a multi-scenarios dynamic matching algorithm for hierarchical treatment system by modifying comprehensive satisfaction integration function and differential adjustment function. This paper concentrated on the stability and total satisfaction goals of system matching. This method serves as a decision-making reference for the bilateral matching encountered in the problem of “hierarchical treatment system” around the world.
Kathryn Sarah Campy,
Multi-Scenarios Dynamic Matching Algorithm for Hierarchical Treatment System, International Journal of Biomedical Engineering and Clinical Science.
Vol. 4, No. 2,
2018, pp. 36-47.
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