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Related Party Cooperation, Ownership Structure and Value Creation
American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Business
Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages: 8-12
Received: Sep. 17, 2016; Accepted: Oct. 17, 2016; Published: Oct. 28, 2016
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Zhi-hong Song, Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan, China
Xiao-fei Che, School of Economics and Management, Shanxi University, Taiyuan, China
Yan-xin Guo, School of Mathematical Sciences, Shanxi University, Taiyuan, China
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Taking the 141 related party cooperation announcements by Chinese listed companies from January 2001 to December 2013 as the sample, the article investigates the impact of the focal firms’ ownership structure and relative characteristics of related parties on the focal firms’ value creation. The empirical results indicate that ownership concentration negatively affect the value creation, while equity restriction has no influence on the focal firms’ value creation. The related party’s relative scale plays a significantly positive role on the focal firms’ value creation, while the related party’s relative associated relationship is negatively related to the focal firms’ value creation. The article contributes to the current literature by investigating whether the governance mechanism of listed companies could create value for the focal firms under the background of related party cooperation, and providing empirical evidence about the influence of ownership structure and relative characteristics of related party on the focal firms’ value creation.
Related Party Cooperation, Ownership Concentration, Equity Restriction, Value Creation
To cite this article
Zhi-hong Song, Xiao-fei Che, Yan-xin Guo, Related Party Cooperation, Ownership Structure and Value Creation, American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Business. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2016, pp. 8-12. doi: 10.11648/j.ajtab.20160202.11
Copyright © 2016 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License ( which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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