Determinants of Organizational Design Choices in Spanish Nongovernmental Development Organizations
European Business & Management
Volume 3, Issue 3, May 2017, Pages: 47-56
Received: Jan. 17, 2017; Accepted: Jun. 22, 2017; Published: Jul. 27, 2017
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Victor Martín-Pérez, Business Department, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain
Natalia Martín-Cruz, Business Department, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain
Juan Hernangómez-Barahona, Business Department, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain
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This paper adds to the scant literature on the internal structure of organizations by focusing on the organizational design of nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs). Specifically, we evaluate prominent Spanish NGDOs during 2010 to determine the balance of two key organizational design choices at the NGDO’s project department: delegation of authority to lower-level employees and the provision of incentive compensation to ensure that these employees do not misuse their discretion. We develop a simultaneous model of these two choices that treats delegation and incentive compensation as endogenous variables. The results of our empirical analysis provide evidence that delegation of decision rights and incentive compensation systems are interdependent allowing scholars and practitioners a better understanding of the determinants of organizational design choices.
Delegation, Incentive Compensation, Job Authority, NGDOs, Nonprofit Organizations
To cite this article
Victor Martín-Pérez, Natalia Martín-Cruz, Juan Hernangómez-Barahona, Determinants of Organizational Design Choices in Spanish Nongovernmental Development Organizations, European Business & Management. Vol. 3, No. 3, 2017, pp. 47-56. doi: 10.11648/j.ebm.20170303.12
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License ( which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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