A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol
Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Volume 3, Issue 2-1, March 2015, Pages: 39-45
Received: Dec. 10, 2014;
Accepted: Dec. 13, 2014;
Published: Dec. 30, 2014
Views 3273 Downloads 204
Esmail Kaffashi, Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Pardazeshgaran Gam Aval, Mashhad, Iran
Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Industrial department, University of Applied Science, SID Bojnourd Center, Bojnourd, Iran
Forough Khademsadegh, Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Soheila Amirian, Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Follow on us
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.
Security, Routing Protocols, Link-State, OSPF, New Attack
To cite this article
Ahmad Madadi Mousavi,
Hamid Rezaei Rahvard,
Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi,
A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol, Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. Special Issue: Research and Practices in Electrical and Electronic Engineering in Developing Countries.
Vol. 3, No. 2-1,
2015, pp. 39-45.
Russell Chris, Security of IP Routing Protocols, SANS Institute, Global Information Assurance Certification Paper, October 7, 2001.
Andrew A. Vladimirov, Konstantin V. Gavrilenko, Hacking Exposed Cisco Networks, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2006.
Michael Sudkovitch, David I. Roitman, OSPF Security Project – Technion Institute of Technology, 2010.
Vanessa Antoine, Raymond Bongiorni et al, Router Security Configuration Guide, National Security Agency [C4-040R-02], 2005.
Faraz Shamim, Zaheer Aziz, Troubleshooting IP Routing Protocols (CCIE® Professional Development), Cisco Press, 2002.
Brian Vetter, Feiyi Wang, S. Felix Wu, an Experimental Study of Insider Attacks for the OSPF Routing Protocol, In 5th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, 1997.
S. F. Wu, H.C. Chang, F. Jou, F. Wang, F. Gong, C. Sargor, JiNao: Design and Implementation of Scalable Intrusion Detection System for the OSPF Routing Protocol, DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX'00, 1999 , Pages 69-83, IEEE Article, 1999.
John Moy, OSPF Version 2, IETF RFC 2328, April 1998. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2328.txt
Emanuele Jones, Olivier Le Moigne, OSPF Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, Internet Draft: draft-jones-ospf-vuln-01.txt, IETF 58 –RPSEC Working Group, November 2003.
Daniel Mende, Rene Graf, Enno Rey, Christopher Werny, Burning Asgard, an Introduction to the Tool Loki, Black Hat Digital Self Defense Conference USA, 2010 Jul 05.
Wendell Odom, CCNP ROUTE 642-902, Cisco Press, 2010.
Infonetics Research, "Enterprise Routers Quarterly Market Share, Size, and Forecasts", May 2012
Esmail Kaffashi, Hamid Rezaei rahvard, “Discovered a new security hole in OSPF routing protocol”, 16th conference of National Association of Electrical Engineering, Iran, Kazeroon, August 2013.