Industry Variations of Relationship Banking in Mergers and Acquisitions
Journal of Investment and Management
Volume 4, Issue 6, December 2015, Pages: 409-418
Received: Nov. 26, 2015; Accepted: Dec. 5, 2015; Published: Dec. 14, 2015
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Zeynep Topaloglu, Department of Banking and Finance, Bursa Orhangazi University, Bursa, Turkey
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In this study we examine the acquirer-advisor relation in mergers and acquisitions. Among other issues we study the effect of this relation in major industry sectors. We have found that the average log abnormal return from acquirer-advisor relation is $0.5 millions. Relationship advisers are rewarding in the range of $1.5 millions to $2.5 millions in all sectors except media, consumer products and services, high technology, industrials and real estate.
Mergers and Acquisitions, Relationship Advisers, Relationship Banking, M & A Advising
To cite this article
Zeynep Topaloglu, Industry Variations of Relationship Banking in Mergers and Acquisitions, Journal of Investment and Management. Vol. 4, No. 6, 2015, pp. 409-418. doi: 10.11648/j.jim.20150406.25
Copyright © 2015 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License ( which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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